The blame for the Cold War cannot be placed on one person -- it
developed as a series of chain reactions as a struggle for supremacy. It
can be argued that the Cold War was inevitable, and therefore no one's
fault, due to the differences in the capitalist and communist ideologies.
It was only the need for self-preservation that had caused the two
countries to sink their differences temporarily during the Second World War.
Yet many of the tensions that existed in the Cold War can be attributed to
Stalin's policy of Soviet expansion. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine the role of Stalin as a catalyst to the Cold War.

Stalin's foreign policies contributed an enormous amount to the
tensions of the Cold War. His aim, to take advantage of the military
situation in post-war Europe to strengthen Russian influence, was perceived
to be a threat to the Americans. Stalin was highly effective in his goal
to gain territory, with victories in Poland, Romania, and Finland. To the
western world, this success looked as if it were the beginning of serious
Russian aggressions. The western view of the time saw Stalin as doing one
of two things: either continuing the expansionist policies of the tsars
that preceded him, or worse, spreading communism across the world now that
his "one-state" notion had been fulfilled. It also must be mentioned that
Stalin is seen as wanting "unchalleged personal power and a rebuilt Russia
strong enough to withstand 'caplitalist encirclement.'"1

Admittedly, the first view of Stalin, as an imperialist leader, may
be skewed. The Russians claim, and have always claimed, that Stalin's
motives were purely defensive. Stalin's wished to create a buffer zone of
Communist states around him to protect Soviet Russia from the capitalist
West. In this sense, his moves were not aggressive at all -- they were
truly defensive moves to protect the Soviet system. His suspicions of
Western hostility were not unfounded: the British and U.S. intervention in
the Russian Civil War (1918-1920) were still fresh in Stalin's memory when
he took power. Furthermore, Stalin was bitter because he was not informed
of U.S. nuclear capabilities until shortly before the atomic borab was
dropped on Hiroshima. Compounding tensions was the fact that Stalin's
request that Russia be allowed to participate in the occupation of Japan
was denied, even though Russia had declared war on Japan on 8th August (the
borab was dropped on Hiroshima on 10th August) and had been responsible for
annexing south Sakhalin as agreed to at Yalta. This failure to be included
in the Western world's politics created an even deeper rift between the two
superpowers.

Clashes between Stalin and the West first appear at the Yalta and
Potsdam Conferences in February and July 1946, respectively. Though the
mood at Yalta was more or less cooperative, Stalin agitated matters by
demanding that all German territory east of the Rivers Oder and Neisse be
given to Poland (and thus remain under Soviet influence). Both Roosevelt
and Churchill refused to agree to these demanRAB. The Soviet Union
responded bluntly, saying "..the Soviet Government cannot agree to the
existence in Poland of a Government hostile to it."2 The atmosphere at the
Potsdam Conference was noticeably cooler, with Truman replacing Roosevelt
as the representative from the United States. "Truman...had been kept in
complete ignorance by Roosevelt about foreign policy,"3 which meant that
Truman was not aware of the secret assurances of security Roosevelt had
made to Stalin. His policy towarRAB Soviet Russia, then, was much more
severe than that of Roosevelt. He was quoted as saying "We must stand up
to the Russians...We have been too easy with them."4 Both Truman and
Churchill were annoyed because Germany east of the Rivers Oder and Neisse
were being occupied by Russian troops and were being run by the pro-
communist Polish government, who expelled over five million Germans. This
went directly against the agreements made at Yalta earlier in the year.
The west viewed this as an act of aggression on the part of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union responded with a statement saying "Poland broders
with the Soviet Union, what [sic] cannot be said of Great Britain or the
United States."5

From this point, the Cold War truly becomes a chain reaction. In
March of 1946, Churchill presented his 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton,
Missouri, in response to the spread of communism in eastern Europe. He
called for a western alliance to corabat the threat. Stalin's response was
hostile: rather than trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement, Stalin
continued to tighten his grip on eastern Europe. Communist governments
were installed in every area of eastern Europe (barring Czechoslovakia) by
the end of 1947. These governments were implemented by guerrilla tactics:
elections were rigged, non-communist merabers of the governments were
expelled, with many being arrested or executed, and eventually, Stalin
dissolved all non-communist political parties. Stalin began to implement a
reign of terror using the Russian Army and his secret police force.
Moreover, Stalin had increased his influence in the Russian zone of Germany
as if it belonged to Russia. He allowed only the communist party and
drained the area of its vital resources.

The West reacted. It appeared to them that Russia's attitude went
against all of the promises that Stalin had made at Yalta -- namely, that
Stalin would permit free elections in the eastern European states. Russia
argued that it needed to maintain a sphere of influence in the area for
security reasons: to this, even Churchill agreed in 1944. Further, Russia
argued that the areas had never had democratic governments, and that a
communist system would allow these 'backward countries' to progress and
flourish. Stalin's policy of expansion worried the West: in response, the
West introduced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, both of which
sought to arrest the spread of communism.

Stalin's aggressive tactics did not end with creating a sphere of
influence. Stalin re-established Cominform in Septeraber 1947. Cominform
represented a union of all of the communist states within Europe, including
representatives from the French and Italian communist parties. Even within
this communist structure, Stalin had to exert his influence. It was not
enough for a state to be merely communist: it had to adopt the Russian-
style communism. Furthermore, the states within Cominform were expected to
keep trade within the Cominform meraber states, and were discouraged from
making any contact with the Western world. Russia strengthened the ties
with the Cominform countries through the Molotov plan, which offered
Russian aid to the satellite states, and the establishment of Comecon,
which served to coordinate the economic policies of the communist states.
These actions on the part of Stalin only increased the rift between the
capitalist and the communist systems, and made future compromise and
negotiations more difficult.

Perhaps the most aggressive move that Stalin made, however, was the
takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Several key issues arose in
this conflict. First, the U.S. felt alienated when Czechoslovakia rejected
Marshall Aid, which the U.S. blamed on the influence of the communist party.
Second, the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia was a communist, the
President and Foreign Minister were not. Finally, the fact that the
communists took power in Czechoslovakia by means of an armed coup sent
waves of fear through the western world, causing the 'iron curtain' to fall
even further. The U.N. had its hanRAB tied, because there were 'free'
elections (the candidates were all communist) and there was no proof of
Russian involvement. While it cannot be proved that Stalin ordered the
coup, the signals were clear: Stalin had likely encouraged the coup, and it
was not coincidental that Russian troops in Austria were moved up to the
Czech border. Czechoslovakia was the final east-west bridge, and with the
fall of it, the 'iron curtain' was complete.

The final hostile movement of Stalin of importance was the Berlin
blockade and airlift. When Russia grew dissatisfied with the economic
disparity that had developed in Berlin, it responded by closing all road,
rail and canal links between West Berlin and West German. The goal was to
force western powers from West Berlin by reducing it to the starvation
point.

While the blame for the Cold War cannot be placed on a single man,
Stalin's expansionist policy was clearly an ever-present catalyst in the
war. Certain Truman was not blameless, but the U.S. was not expanding its
empire -- the Soviet Union was. Whether the expansion was for self-
preservation, or whether it was merely imperialistic expansion, is
relatively immaterial. What Stalin's actions unarguably did was start a
string of chain-reactions within the western powers, and therefore, a good
deal of the blame must rest with him.

Bibliography

Aronsen, Lawrence & Martin Kitchen, The Origins of the Cold War in
Comparative Perspective: American, British and Canadian Relations with the
Soviet Union 1941-1948. London: MacMillan Press, 1988.

Davis, Lynn E. The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern
Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974.

Dockrill, Michael. The Cold War: 1945-1963. London: MacMillan Education
Ltd., 1988.

Halle, Louis J. The Cold War as History. London: Chatto & Windus, 1971.

Jonsson, Christer. Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign
Policy. London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1984.

LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990, 6th ed..
New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1991.

Maier, Charles S., ed. The Origins of the Cold War and Contemporary Europe.
New York: New Viewpoints, 1978.

McCauley, Martin. The Origins of the Cold War. Essex: Longman Group Ltd.,
1983.

Smith, Joseph. The Cold War, 1945-1965. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd.,
1989.
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